Reinsurance Today
It has been said that insurance is the last of the …nancial services to accept radical change [Denney 1996 ]. Yet there has been a fundamental shift in the geographical location and in the organization of the reinsurance industry in the last six years [Chichilnisky 1996a ]. Global environmental risks are partly responsible for this change. Increased weather volatility and catastrophic risks are di¢cult to diversify using traditional insurance practices.
To provide a map to the future, we need a realistic appraisal of how we got where we are, which is the story of how humans have hedged risks [ see Bernstein for a detailed review of this]. There are two basic and distinct approaches: statistical and economic. The former is typical of the insurance industry; the latter typi…es the securities industry. Both are needed to manage today's catastrophic risks. Neither alone will do. We will show below how a combination of both leads to e¢cient outcomes, and is the way to the future [Chichilnisky 1996b ].
The volatility of weather, taken together with population movement to warm coastal areas and changing property prices, has made catastrophic risks highly unpredictable. Many scientists believe that climate change could be the source. A recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), charged by governments with investigating global warming, says that humans have a 'discernible' in ‡uence on global climate. In May 1996 insurance executives confronted the energy industry over global warming, and took their case to the UN Geneva meeting on climate change in June 1996 [Boulton 1996] . Their case was heard, and for the …rst time the US took a leading position in supporting the developing countries' calls for hard targets on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the industrial countries.
Financial Risks
Although the data on climate change is not conclusive, the …nancial challenge is already real. In the last few years the property/casualty insurance industry has experienced record claims of about US$43 billion connected with climate volatility. In the United States alone there was the 1988 Midwest drought, the 1993 Midwest ‡oods and 1995 ‡ooding along the California Coast. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 produced about US$18 billion of insured losses, and total losses greater than US$25 billion. Some suggest that this is connected to trends in the overall behavior of the climate system.
Andrew was the most devastating natural catastrophe ever recorded. It also led to a wave of …nancial catastrophe: the hurricane a¤ected almost every insurance company in the United States. Not knowing how to hedge unpredictable risks adds the risk of …nancial catastrophe on top of that of the natural catastrophe, a onetwo punch that could lead to a social debacle. The year after Andrew thirty eight non-US and eight US reinsurers, with names as familiar as Continental Re and New England Re, either withdrew from the business or ceased underwriting catastrophe reinsurance.
Facing an impossible challenge, many reinsurers left the market. Worldwide reinsurance capacity dropped more that 30 percent between 1989 and 1993, over 20 percent of which was due to Andrew. This naturally led to changes in the marketplace. Insurance companies could not buy enough catastrophe reinsurance, no matter how hard they tried. As supply dried up, prices of course increased dramatically: the rate on line went from 8.2% in 1989 to 21.4% in 1994.
Higher prices then attracted new capital. This led to a major geographical shift of the industry. The continuing doubts about the future existence of Lloyd's of London led to a drop in the UK market share, from about 56% in 1989 to 23% in 1995. Since 1993 Bermuda's reinsurance industry evolved from practically zero to its current position of 25% of the market. Investment banks are now betting heavily on the reinsurance market. They are the owners of most of the businesses created since 1992.
Revolution in Global Finance
Together with the geographical shift there has been a substantial shift in the industry's strategy. Insurance derivatives have been recommended for several years and are starting to emerge and play a role. In 1992 we recommended the creation of an instrument to bet on the frequencies of catastrophes [Chichilnisky and Heal 1993] , which the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) introduced under the name Catastrophe Futures in 1993. This year Morgan Stanley started marketing a similar instrument: a bond issue whose returns are linked to hurricane frequency and severity in the current US season. Recently Merrill Lynch structured a transaction for USAA, the country's largest direct marketer of home and car insurance, o¤ering US$500 million in bonds on the US capital markets which are tied to the company's losses from hurricanes [Waters 1996 ]. Financial innovation in reinsurance markets is slowly taking shape, but the underlying pressure is relentless. Everyone knows that access to more liquid capital markets is essential to the reinsurance industry. The derivatives market is the key to liquid and ‡exible trading of weather risks.
Unknown Risks
What are unknown risks? These are risks whose frequencies we do not know, and for which we are aware of our ignorance [Chichilnisky 1996c ]. You could think of these as risks for which we have more than one actuarial table, each equally likely. There is more than one prior estimate of the frequency of the event [Cass et al.] .
Examples of unknown risks are environmental health risks of new and little known epidemics; risks induced by scienti…c uncertainty in predicting the frequency and severity of catastrophic events, such as nuclear reactor and satellite risks. These risks are driving major changes in the insurance and reinsurance industry today Heal 1994, 1998 ] Take a simple example. One reliable source gives a 2% annual chance of the occurrence of a hurricane of a certain type, and another a 12% chance. Montecarlo simulations and other procedures can be used to attempt to tease from all models a unique statistical approximation to the true frequency. But what if there is no true frequency? How could this be? Easily. There may be two possible climate patterns, both equally likely. This is typical of complex systems such as the climate.
Chaotic Risks
Many climate experts view climate as a fundamentally non-linear phenomenon in which chaotic patterns emerge easily [Tziperman et al. ] . Such systems can have two 'attractors,' or two distinct overall patterns of behavior, each signi…cantly likely. Each of these attractors describes a weather pattern, a reasonable statistical inference of the frequencies of a major events. In such a chaotic system, it is scienti…cally impossible to predict from the initial conditions which of the two patterns the climate will result: a pattern with two hurricanes a year, or the other with a dozen. Because we cannot predict, we face a risk. We call it a chaotic risk because it emerges from the chaotic nature of the climate system.
The …rst statistical reaction is to construct a new actuarial table by taking an average: assuming the two states are equally likely, this is 7. But taking an average does not help. It only ensures that one is wrong 100% of the time: 50% of the time one is overinsured (the pattern with two hurricanes per year) and the other 50% underinsured (the pattern with a dozen a year). Both have major …nancial costs. In our case, if each hurricane leads to US$2 billion in losses, then the averaging method leads to a US$10 billion shortfall 50% of the time and US$10 billion overinsurance the other 50% of the time. Hardly a considered way to manage risks.
Is there a solution to this problem? The good news is that there is. It is possible to hedge such unknown risks successfully and e¢ciently, using what we call catastrophe bundles. To do so, however, one needs a careful and customized approach which blends in both the insurance and securities approaches to hedging risks.
5 Two ways to hedge risk
Insurance: the statistical approach
The statistical approach to hedging risks relies on the law of large numbers and is the traditional foundation of the insurance industry. For this to work, risks must be reasonably independent across individuals or groups, and the frequencies must be known. Loss of life and car accidents are typical examples. Here the law of large numbers operates.
There is safety in numbers: with a large enough population the number of those likely to be a¤ected is known with considerable accuracy. The sample mean is highly predictable if the distribution for each person or group is known. This is the standard principle on which insurance operates. Reinsurance is simply a way to augment the pool of those a¤ected so that the law of large numbers operates better. All that is needed is a reliable actuarial table describing the incidence per person or group, and a large pool of insureds to distribute the risk.
If the numbers are not large enough, it is standard to spread risk through time. The number of people a¤ected by a hurricane over a 10 years period is at least 10 times that a¤ected in one year. This requires that the risks be independent through time, eliminating irreversible risks such as a once-and-for-all shifts arising from global warming.
Hurricanes such as Andrew (1992) and Opal (1995) , however, defy the law of large numbers. They a¤ect large areas all at once, both in physical and in …nancial terms, and their frequency and severity seems to be changing. The actuarial table itself has become the risk. Insurance does not work. What are the alternatives?
Derivatives: the economic approach
The alternative is the economic approach. This works best for correlated risks, in which the same event occurs for many people all at once. A drop in the value of the dollar is an example: the event is the same for everyone in the US economy. There is no way to pool this risk: however, as we all know, we can hedge it by using derivatives (currency futures or options). The principle used here is negative correlation. One hedges by taking a position which is highly correlated with the risk, only with the opposite sign.
For example, an investor with a dollar based portfolio who fears a drop in the value of the dollar can buy a futures contract in yen, or a dollar put. If the dollar drops in value he is covered by the increase in the value of the derivative. Bear funds have been constructed on this principle.
The economic procedure is radically di¤erent from the insurance approach in that it does not require a large number of people. Nor does it require knowing the frequency of the event or the actuarial table. This fundamentally di¤erent method is the way the securities industry operates. Instead of pooling risks, one trades risks.
Securities markets are however notoriously complex. For example the procedure of trading risks just outlined makes no sense for individual risks, such as death. How to describe the death of one single person within a large economy as one event on which all of us can trade? To do so would require an unrealistically high number of securities, indeed 2 x , where x is the number of people in the economy. In a world with …ve billion people the number of securities could exceed the number of all known particles in the universe.
Insurance, instead, deals with such risks expeditiously: if all individuals are in the same risks class, one insurance contract would su¢ce. The contrast is stark, but it makes a point. In a world of unknown risks neither securities nor insurance methods work in isolation.
The ideal hedge: catastrophe bundles
We saw that insurance does not work when the frequency of a risk is unknown, and securities do not work when the risks are individual. If neither of these two approaches works on their own, then, what does work?
There are several possibilities. One is a combination of insurance and securities: this can achieve e¢cient allocation of risk bearing. We call this a catastrophe bundle because it bundles up two types of instruments. It consists of an insurance instrument and a novel derivative security for betting on the frequency itself. The latter type of security is now traded in the CBOT; as mentioned related securities have recently emerged also in the form of bonds ‡oated by Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch. The combination of both instruments ensures that the reinsurer is not exposed to more risks than it anticipates whatever the pattern of the hazards.
Alternatively, we can use a modi…ed and more complex form of insurance, with contracts conditional on the frequency of the observed event. In this case no separate securities transactions are needed. A third possibility is to use what is called mutual insurance, together with the securities described above.
Elsewhere we have shown that these approaches lead to an e¢cient allocation of risk bearing [Chichilnisky and Heal, 1998: Cass et al.] . They require a carefully customized approach to hedging risk. This gives the traditional face-to-face insurance approach an edge over raw technology.
Convergence of Insurance and Securities Markets
It is no secret that the securities industry is making inroads into the reinsurance business. By itself, however, it cannot succeed, because the individual parts of the risks cannot be handled e¢ciently by securities markets: they are too cumbersome for individual risks. Insurance, based on the law of large numbers, has an important place in simplifying …nancial transactions and hedging known individual risks. Catastrophe bundles o¤er one approach to computing the limits of each instrument, and blending them optimally to achieve the most competitive pricing of a catastrophe reinsurance portfolio.
The future of the industry is in the hands of those who achieve the perfect balance, through integrating derivative securities with contingent insurance contracts, and integrating technology with customized face-to-face know-how.
Hurricane Risks and El Niño: an Example
How exactly would we combine insurance and securities, and how would this combination use scienti…c knowledge and models? Here we answer that question with a very simple but nonetheless typical example, drawn from hurricane insurance. A general presentation is in [Chichilnisky and Heal 1998 ].
Hurricane incidence in the South Eastern US is conditioned by the ENSO cycle, being higher than average in La Niña years and lower than average in El Niño years. This implies that looking ahead to a forthcoming year, we cannot know the distribution of hurricanes in that year: we cannot describe the risks associated with hurricane damage. We may be able to do this conditional on an El Niño or La Niña year, but we cannot make an unconditional assessment.. The table below shows possible probability distributions of damage due to hurricanes conditional on being in El Niño or La Niña years. The numbers we use in this example are purely illustrative. We assume that in an El Niño year, there is a 10% chance of a $5 billion loss due to hurricanes in the South Eastern US, a 20% chance of a $10 billion loss, and a 10% chance of a $15 billion loss. The expected value of the damage is therefore (0:1 £ $5) + (0:2 £ $10) + (0:1 £ $15) = $4 billion. In a La Niña year, assume for illustration that the probabilities are 20%, 30% and 20% respectively, giving an expected loss of $7 billion. We also take it that there is a 40% chance of an El Niño year, and a 60% chance of a La Niña year. (This is a simpli…cation: there are also years which are neither, so-called neutral years.) In practice the distribution of hurricanes by maximum wind speed follows a power law [Barton et al.] , though the distribution of the dollar values of damage claims may be quite di¤erent. The total value of insured property is taken as $30 billion, so that in a worst case scenariowhen the hurricane damage is at its maximum of $15 billion-half of this value is at risk.
In an El Niño year the expected loss is 13.33% of the insured risks and in a La Niña year it is 23.33%. It follows that the rates-on-line (i.e. premia as a percentage of the insured amount) conditional on being in El Niño and La Niña years would need to be at least 13.33% and 23.33% respectively to break even in expected value terms.
As noted, expected losses are di¤erent depending on what type of year we are in. Before we know what kind of year will occur, we therefore have an expected loss due to El Niño equal to the expected loss in an El Niño year times the probability of such a year, i.e. (0:4 £ $4) = $1:6 billion. For La Niña the equivalent calculation is (0:6 £ $7) = $4:2 billion. Hence ex ante, before we know which year we are or will be in, the expected losses in El Niño and La Niña years are respectively $1.6 billion and $4.2 billion, giving a total of $5.8 billion as the annual expected loss altogether.
Insurance Contingent on ENSO
We can now compute the premiums that would have to be charged for cover speci…c to each type of year before the type of year is known, in order to break even on average. These would have to be the premia contingent on being in each year-seen above to be 13.33% and 23.33% for El Niño and La Niña respectively-multiplied by the probabilities of each type of year. Thus the ex ante premia or rates-on-line (before it is known whether we are in an El Niño or a La Niña year) have to be at least (0:4 £ 13:33%) = 5:33% or (0:6 £ 23:33%) = 13:99% respectively for breakeven.
In sum, insurers could provide cover for those exposed to hurricane risks and also break even by o¤ering two separate insurance policies, one for coverage in El Niño years and another one for coverage in La Niña years. The premia would be at least 5:33% and 13:99% respectively. A client requiring complete cover would have to buy both. Each policy would re ‡ect both the probability of a hurricane in the appropriate type of year combined with the probability of such a year.
In the context of a simple example with only two relevant states, El Niño and La Niña, this approach could be manageable, although one can imagine some clients balking at the idea of contingent insurance. In reality there are three states, El Niño La Niña and neutral. For other climate phenomena, or for other regions of the world, or for catastrophes other than tropical storms, the number may be larger. In such cases it may be preferable to keep the structure of the insurance o¤ered to clients unchanged, and handle the risk to the insurer associated with this approach by using securities markets. We look into this next.
Securities Contingent on ENSO
On the other hand, insurers may follow the conventional procedure of charging premiums based on the overall expected loss and not distinguishing between the two climate patterns. The insurance o¤ered is not contingent: it is conventional insurance, which may be easier to place with end users. In this case insurers will charge premiums that will bring in their overall ex ante expected loss of $5.8 billion, implying a rate-on-line of 5:8=30 = 19:33%: This is unsatisfactory because in El Niño years, they are overcharging (expected claims are $4 billion: the rate-on-line need only be 13:33%): for La Niña years, undercharging (expected claims are $7 billion: a rate-on-line of 23:33% is needed). In the former, they are charging premia in excess of expected losses by $1.8 billion, hardly a competitive strategy, and in the latter premium income falls short of expected claims by $1.2 billion, clearly a dangerous and unsustainable position. Neither case is satisfactory. To match assets to liabilities properly, they need to shift income from El Niño to La Niña years. This is where securities conditional on incidence, on description of the risk, come into the picture. We need a security whose value depends on whether we are in an El Niño or La Niña year. "Hurricane bonds" of the type issued in 1998 by several US investment banks are approximations to such state-speci…c securities: they pay a return depending on hurricane incidence. For the purposes of this example we take the security to be a tradable ENSO index. A tradable ENSO index is a contract that pays an agreed amount contingent on the value of a physical index of the state of the ESNO system, and provides a direct link between …nancial markets and what scienti…c knowledge tells us is one of the drivers of hurricane risk. By trading this security, the insurer in our example can in e¤ect trade income in El Niño years for income in La Niña years. The odds work out nicely. They want to sell $1.8 billion in an El Niño year, their surplus of premium income over expected claims, which occurs with 40% chance. Correspondingly they need to buy $1.2 billion of income in La Niña years, to cover the shortfall between premium income and expected claims. In our example this happens 60% of the time.
The prices for ENSO index contracts delivering $1 in El Niño and La Niña years will be proportional to the probabilities of these events, and so will be in the ratio of 0:4=0:6 or 2=3. But $1:2bn=$1:8bn = 2=3 so that at such prices the sale of surplus income in El Niño years will exactly …nance the purchase of income to cover the de…cit in La Niña years. Overall, then, we have the following pattern of transactions:
1. Issuing insurance contracts covering damage in either an El Niño or a La Niña year.
2. Selling $1.8 billion of contracts contingent on the ENSO index having a value corresponding to an El Niño year, at a price of $0.40 per dollar.
3. Buying $1.2 billion of contracts contingent on the ENSO index having a value corresponding to a La Niña year, at $0.60 per dollar.
In summary, it is possible to provide a complete hedge to insurers while o¤ering conventional contracts to the insured by trading securities contingent on the state of the ENSO system.
Conclusion
We have set out two ways of insuring catastrophic risks, one involving just the use of state contingent insurance contracts and one involving regular insurance plus statecontingent securities, which we took to be an ENSO index. There is yet a third approach, involving mutual insurance contracts and the ENSO index. This involves pooling the premia paid by the insured parties and then meeting claims out of that pool. Premia would be set according to the overall actuarial risk across El Niño and La Niña years. Obviously the fraction of any claim paid would depend on the total value of claims, and in particular would vary depending on whether we are in an El Niño or a La Niña year. The pool of premia would be more than enough to meet all claims in an El Niño year but would be inadequate in the event of La Niña. This residual risk could then be hedged by trading the ENSO index and shifting income from one state to the other, as illustrated above.
How di¤erent are these approaches from what is being practiced today? The securities being issued today securitize insurance or reinsurance risks, and therefore bring more liquidity to the reinsurance market. This is an improvement. But these securities still leave open the possibility that the insurer is either o¤ering non-competitive rates or taking a dangerous exposure, as illustrated above. Today's securities do not tackle the essence of our approach. The key to catastrophe bundles is to recognize that in a position where there are several possible actuarial tables, all reasonably likely, we have to issue insurance policies contingent on each of these, or introduce and trade securities dependent on them. A speci…c combination of insurance and securities, and an equally speci…c pricing policy, are required for an optimal allocation of risks on competitive terms. With the right combination of securities and insurance, and the right pricing (an issue we have not covered here) we can ensure an outcome that works for insurers and insured.
